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Abstract Inspired by Enactivist philosophy yet in dialog
with it, we ask what theory of embodied cognition might
best serve in articulating implications of Enactivism for
mathematics education. We offer a blend of Dynamical
Systems Theory and Sociocultural Theory as an analytic
lens on micro-processes of action-to-concept evolution. We
also illustrate the methodological utility of design-research
as an approach to such theory development. Building on
constructs from ecological psychology, cultural anthro-
pology, studies of motor-skill acquisition, and somatic
awareness practices, we develop the notion of an ‘‘instru-
mented field of promoted action’’. Children operating in
this field first develop environmentally coupled motor-
action coordinations. Next, we introduce into the field new
artifacts. The children adopt the artifacts as frames of
action and reference, yet in so doing they shift into disci-
plinary semiotic systems. We exemplify our thesis with
two selected excerpts from our videography of Grade 4–6
volunteers participating in task-based clinical interviews
centered on the Mathematical Imagery Trainer for Pro-
portion. In particular, we present and analyze cases of
either smooth or abrupt transformation in learners’ opera-
tory schemes. We situate our design framework vis-a`-vis
seminal contributions to mathematics education research.
All doing is knowing, and all knowing is doing.
(Maturana and Varela 1992, p. 26).
1 General introduction and objectives
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991) state the following:
In a nutshell, the enactive approach consists of two
points: (1) perception consists in perceptually guided
action and (2) cognitive structures emerge from the
recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to
be perceptually guided. (p. 173)
We concur with this view on the irreducibility of cog-
nition, perception, and action in human behavior. We view
motor action as tacitly omnipresent in human reasoning,
including reasoning during the enactment of cultural
practices pertaining to concepts traditionally perceived as
‘‘abstract’’, such as mathematical concepts. However, we
take pause to revisit the implications of Enactivism for a
theory of learning (see also Ernest 2006). Varela et al.
(1991, p. 178) endorse George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s
cognitive semantics theory of conceptual metaphor. Yet,
we respectfully submit that for Enactivist philosophy to
continue contributing to the development of theoretical
models of mathematics education, a theory alternative to
conceptual metaphor might be adopted that better accounts
for the dynamical, interactionist, emergent, sociocultural,
distributed, and developmental aspects of teaching and
learning—all properties of human practice that Enactivism
in fact acknowledges.
Thus our thesis is thus inspired by, yet in dialog with,
Enactivism. We offer a view of conceptual learning that
highlights the role of motor problem solving in the process
of cultural mediation. We argue for our view’s theoretical
plausibility by framing it within a broad reading of the
learning sciences, and we explain the view’s pragmatic
utility by demonstrating its instantiation in a pedagogical
intervention. The objective of this paper is to: (1) outline an
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acognitivist, anti-representationist account of how percep-
tuomotor doing becomes disciplinary knowing; and (2)
argue for the methodological utility of the design-oriented
investigatory approach our research team has undertaken in
the empirical pursuit of these ideas.
Our account of how doing evolves into knowing treats
conceptual learning as grounded in motor problem solving
(Abrahamson et al. 2011). The account attempts to inte-
grate and elaborate on conjectures previously raised by
cognitive scientists engaged in research on learning.
Namely, we embark from the conjecture that mental
actions, including those characterized as mathematical
cognition, are ‘‘embodied’’ in the sense of being grounded
in simulations of sensorimotor processes through the use of
the same neural resources as are active in bodily perception
and action (Barsalou 2010). At the same time, we view
action as constrained yet enabled by contextually relevant
features of the world, including the cultural practices that
induce, frame, and form the agent’s goal-oriented partici-
patory activity.
In fact, as educational researchers with dual commitment
to both pedagogy and scholarship, we deliberately attempt to
illuminate tensions and opportunities inherent in the dia-
lectics of naı¨ve individual agency and formal cultural
structures as they play out in instructional regimes. And yet
this dual commitment leads us to critique extant instruc-
tional practices. Consequently, our research program
involves designing new environments that embed learners in
interaction systems wherein naı¨ve sensorimotor coupling is
nurtured into formal mathematical activity. In this sense, we
see our work as a continuation of design frameworks
advocated by pioneers of embodied mathematics education.
For example, Zoltan Die´ne`s maintained, and we concur, that
‘‘children will learn by acting on a situation’’ (in Sriraman
and Lesh, 2007, p. 61). Yet whereas Die´ne`s, Dewey,
Montessori, Gattegno, Skemp, Freudenthal, and other ped-
agogical visionaries looked to mathematical products of
acting on a situation, our research focus is more on the
actions themselves, that is, the process of this doing-to-
knowing evolution. Specifically, our focus on physical and
simulated action as the cognitive underpinnings of mathe-
matical concepts shifts and recalibrates our gaze away from
what the students produce to how they go about producing it.
In this article, we describe learners’ experiences of
attempting to accomplish a given task in a novel computer-
based environment and argue for the pedagogical impor-
tance of attending to emergent transformations in motor
action patterns that learners experience, acknowledge, and
articulate in the course of their interactions. In our view,
conceptual knowledge, or at least the manifest competence
usually labeled as such, emerges for the agent from guided
sensorimotor interaction with cultural artifacts. This
emergence is not ‘‘one way’’ from concrete to abstract, as
in traditional cognitivist views, because the phenomenol-
ogy of reasoning itself is still embodied, quasi-physical,
concrete—that is, best described as a form of doing (Gal-
lese and Lakoff 2005; Kieren et al. 1999; Melser 2004;
Noss and Hoyles 1996; Wilensky 1991). It is in this sense
that we find our work broadly aligned with Enactivist
vision, exemplified by Varela’s (1999) aphorism: ‘‘The
concrete is not a step toward something else: it is both
where we are and how we get to where we will be’’ (p. 7).
To contextualize and support our thesis empirically, we
model the epigenesis of learners’ schemes, or goal-oriented
sensorimotor actions, as they participate in technology-
enabled activities designed to support the development of a
rudimentary mathematical notion, proportionality.
Our thesis, and more broadly our call to leverage yet
adapt the Enactivist view, hinges on some analogous pro-
cess we have discerned across diverse instructional prac-
tices. Namely, we will be comparing our own pedagogical
activities for the concept of proportion with practices that
cultures have developed to foster novices’ motor skills,
including informal indigenous praxis (Reed and Bril 1996)
and formal vocational methodology (Becvar Weddle and
Hollan 2010). We view this surprising similarity as an
opportunity to broaden Enactivist theoretical scopes.
For scholars of embodiment, particularly design-based
researchers of mathematics education, the phenomenon of
motor learning bears practical allure, because motor
learning is an easier research problem than mathematics
learning. Within explicitly embodied domains of practice,
expert and novice actions are physical and pragmatic,
affording researchers more transparency onto those sub-
jects’ reasoning processes as compared to the case of
implicitly embodied mathematical activity. Our research
program’s overarching intellectual gambit is thus to side-
step from mathematics to motor skill, learn over there what
we can about practices and processes of teaching and
learning, and then sidestep back to mathematics, where we
search, research, and design for useful parallels. In other
words, we hope to avail of humanity’s ancient pedagogical
heritage as we struggle to fashion contemporary pedagog-
ical practices.
The following literature review (Sect. 2), methods out-
line (Sect. 3), and empirical findings (Sect. 4) explore
intellectual terrain that is mostly uncharted by learning
scientists, particularly mathematics education research-
ers—a dynamical-systems model of conceptual accultura-
tion. Yet this terra incognita, we argue, is well aligned
with Enactivism and, what more, offers viable means of
honing its central tenets. As such, we hope to exemplify
how ‘‘perception consists in perceptually guided action’’
and how ‘‘cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent
sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually
guided’’.
296 D. Abrahamson, D. Trninic
123
2 Learning emerges from the situated solution of motor
problems: scientific antecedents
2.1 Scaffolding motor development: Edward Reed
and Blandine Bril
Edward Reed, an ecological psychologist, and Blandine
Bril, a social anthropologist, describe indigenous practices
that apparently foster infant development of culturally
valued physical capabilities. Mothers in remote Sub-Sah-
aran villages were observed to enact shared routines of
handling their infants so that they learn to move in new
ways. Society thus intervenes in shaping infant develop-
ment by creating circumstances—fields of promoted
action—that encourage the building and exercising of
particular motor capacities required for effective partici-
pation in cultural activities (Reed and Bril 1996). In fields
of promoted action, the field is constituted and adminis-
tered by experienced cultural agents, and the action per-
formed by novices. This global phenomenon, we submit,
bears more than allegorical resemblance to mathematics
education. Rather, it epitomizes pedagogical practice, or at
least the type we envision, in which learners are thrust into
motor problem situations and begin learning to move in
new ways before they signify these motor plans mathe-
matically. Mathematics education researchers, we argue,
should benefit from closer scrutiny into fields of promoted
motor action—their sociogenesis, resources, processes,
contributing factors, and context sensitivities (see also
Antle et al. 2013). In particular, researchers should closely
examine the inception of personal solutions via the cou-
pling of goal-oriented actions and emerging affordances of
objects (Schwartz and Martin 2006).
2.2 Dynamical Systems Theory: Esther Thelen
The work of developmental psychologist Esther Thelen
and collaborators (Thelen and Smith 1994) lends insight
into scheme epigenesis at the interface of organism and
environment. Building on Gerald Edelman’s Theory of
Neural Darwinism (Edelman 1987), Thelen theorized
cognitive and motor capacity as continuously co-emerging
via resonance loops among overlapping neural groups that
govern situated and goal-oriented multimodal perceptions
and actions. The dynamic-systems view of neural devel-
opment—as an alternative to the then-prevalent neuro-
maturational view—was popularized through Thelen’s
groundbreaking demonstration that infants can walk many
months before their normative schedule, but only if their
body mass is supported, such as in a water tub. Walking,
Thelen posited, is not an innate capacity per se but emerges
interactively as the solution to a motor problem: where
local goals interact dynamically with contingent
circumstances, physical actions emerge that, proven
effective, are rehearsed and thus potentially reapplied upon
other terrains.1
Thelen’s theory was dramatically validated by its pro-
posal to explain infant behavior on laboratory tasks that
hitherto had been considered ‘‘purely cognitive’’ (e.g., the
‘‘A-not-B’’ task) by appealing to the perseveration of per-
ceptuomotor routines. As such, goal-oriented motor actions
that agents perform in the service of gathering information
(epistemic actions, see Kirsh and Maglio 1994) endure into
explicitly and implicitly embodied performance, perhaps as
much as the information these actions recover.
2.3 Motion learning as functional integration: Moshe
Feldenkrais
The physicist, martial-arts leader, and autodidact motor-
action scientist Moshe Feldenkrais created a somatic
awareness practice celebrated as a means both of self-
development and alleviation of physical ailment. With
regards to the latter rehabilitation technique, empirical
research has repeatedly demonstrated its effectiveness,
even indicating its superiority over conventional physio-
therapy (e.g., Lundblad et al. 1999). The rationale of the
Feldenkrais somatic education methodology, its practitio-
ners maintain, bears relevance to any pedagogical approach
seeking to foster new action patterns as the basis for con-
ceptual development.2
An essential principle in the Feldenkrais practice is to
create guided opportunities for students to untangle their
action complexes into simpler motor components, modify
these components, and then foster their selective reinte-
gration into more salubrious complexes. Importantly, stu-
dents must assume a degree of agency in achieving novel
motion complexes. As Ginsburg (2010) clarifies: ‘‘Learn-
ing itself is not conscious. The integration process itself is
not conscious. Nevertheless, the process depends on con-
scious processes in feeling and detecting changes. The
consequence is felt as difference’’ (p. 185). This notion—
that unconscious, subtle interactions drive adaptations to
behavior, and that consciousness plays a post facto
appraisal role in making sense of these changes—is crucial
1 See Clancey (2008) for a survey of complementary intellectual
antecedents to the situated/embodied/enactive paradigm, such as the
cybernetics research of Gregory Bateson and the robotics work of
Andy Clark.
2 We acknowledge that Feldenkrais scholarship is unconventional as
an academic perspective. Notwithstanding, we value its conjectures
regarding the roles of embodiment and awareness with respect to
learning. These conjectures are original and grounded in a practice
that is empirically shown to be effective. Moreover, the conjectures
parallel many of our own findings, some of which we arrived at prior
to our exposure to Feldenkrais practice.
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to our thesis of conceptual knowledge emerging from
guided interaction through a felt sense of difference.
2.4 Learning as motor problem solving: Nikolai
Bernstein
Independently of the work of Piaget, Feldenkrais, or, for
that matter, Vygotsky, and half a century before Thelen’s
discoveries, the Soviet neurophysiologist Nikolai Bernstein
(1896–1966) stated that motor skill development is ‘‘rep-
etition without repetition’’ (Bernstein 1996). Bernstein’s
insights on cognitive processes underlying motor-skill
development bear implications for pedagogical investiga-
tions. In particular, Bernstein’s work bears on the study of
learning environments designed to foster conceptual
development via engaging learners initially in the solution
of perceptuomotor coordination tasks, what Abrahamson
(2013) calls the action-based genre of embodied design.
Bernstein writes as following:
The actual importance of repetitions is quite different
[than what has formerly been believed]. Repetitions
of a movement or action are necessary in order to
solve a motor problem many times (better and better)
and to find the best ways of solving it. Repetitive
solutions of a problem are also necessary because, in
natural conditions, external conditions never repeat
themselves and the course of the movement is never
ideally reproduced. Consequently, it is necessary to
gain experience relevant to all various modifications
of a task, primarily, to all the impressions that
underlie the sensory corrections of a movement.
(Bernstein 1996, p. 176, original italics here and
below)
Thus the mainstay of skill learning is not in performing
a would-be idealized motor routine but precisely in the
repertory of agile fixes to emerging contingencies, which
Bernstein called automatisms.
Bernstein also warns educators, ‘‘The fact that the
‘secrets’ of swimming or cycling are not in some special
body movements but in special sensations and corrections
explains why these secrets are impossible to teach by
demonstration’’ (p. 187). Thus, a master craftsperson may
demonstrate an idealized enactment of a skill for the neo-
phyte to emulate, but the neophyte learns only through
attempting to imitate this enactment. This principle has
been repeatedly reported in ethnographic studies of craft
training, such as carpentry (Ingold 2011) or pottery
(Churchill 2014). Indeed, you can show me how you apply
saw to wood and you can guide my actions as I myself
wield the tool, but I will have to learn the appropriate felt
sense of this action on my own terms, and on myriad dif-
ferent types of wood, by responding to the felt difference. It
is once again a field of promoted action, yet a field
including an artifact that the novice learns to apply to an
object—it is an instrumented field of promoted action.
Bernstein’s automatisms are thus the cognitive and sensu-
ous residue from having engaged in goal-oriented activity
within an instrumented field of promoted action.
2.5 Fostering instrumented fields of promoted action:
schematic preview of a design
We agree with scholars who argue that instrumented
interaction gives rise to conceptual reasoning (Melser
2004; Roth and Thom 2009; Ve´rillon and Rabardel 1995;
Vygotsky 1978). Yet how this happens and the roles
designers and instructors play in this process is not entirely
clear. Moreover, mathematical activity involves also
operations in a symbolical system, so that a thesis on
embodied mathematical learning should also address
somatic–semiotic coordination.
In our design, detailed below, learners develop a new
type of bimanual coordinated action. That new action turns
out to be moving the hands while changing the spatial
interval between them correlative to the hands’ elevation
above a datum line such as a floor or desk. Learners thus
experience a somatic phase shift, from a default preserva-
tion of a fixed interval to the new coordination parameters
of a changing interval. This shift is semi-inadvertent, as it
begins with nuanced local adjustments absent of a global
motor-action plan. Yet these local adjustments are consis-
tent—the interval grows with elevation and vice versa—
and this consistency, as well the learner’s increasing dex-
terity in executing these automatisms, eventually compels
the learner to notice a global interaction pattern. Then
actions become concepts through the learners’ semi-spon-
taneous appropriation of available semiotic elements they
perceive as bearing ad hoc enactive, discursive, and/or
epistemic utility for accomplishing their objectives.
Moreover, engaging these semiotic means not only shifts
the learner’s discourse into mathematical register but in
turn restructures the action within the task constraints.
Our study participants’ interactions occur within a
carefully orchestrated context—a designed and monitored
instrumented field of promoted action potentially formative
of conceptual development. Left alone to solve the coor-
dination problem, learners are quite unlikely to derive its
mathematical implications—they need framing and steer-
ing from the instructor so as to move from an ‘‘artifact-
sign’’ to a ‘‘mathematical-sign’’ (Bartolini Bussi and
Mariotti 2008). By way of analogy, all bicycle riders regain
balance by steering toward the direction of fall, and yet few
will ever articulate this pervasive scheme as an analytical
generalization. It is the framing of the interaction as part of
a larger cultural activity that may prompt an agent to reflect
298 D. Abrahamson, D. Trninic
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on an otherwise tacit inference from a learning process and
preserve this explicit inference for future reference and
elaboration (Trninic and Abrahamson 2013).
3 Designing and analyzing instrumented fields
of promoted mathematical action
In this section, we outline our research methodology as
well as its relevance for our investigations of embodied
knowing and learning. In sequence, we introduce design-
based research, a general approach to studying human
learning, embodied design, a pedagogical design frame-
work for conceptual learning, and microgenetic analysis,
an intensive qualitative-analysis technique for making
sense of complex human performance occurring over a
relatively brief period of time.
3.1 Design-based research
The overarching approach of our study is that of design-
based research, in which theory and design co-develop
iteratively (Cobb et al. 2003). Design-based research
(DBR) is not a methodology per se but a rich disciplinary
context within which we carry out investigations of
learning and teaching. We do so because we have a con-
jecture as to how learning could be better, and yet current
learning environments are unsuitable for addressing the
conjecture; therefore, we design and evaluate a novel
learning environment. Furthermore, because we cannot
consider ahead of time all the consequences of our actions,
the process of design and its implementation provide
opportunities to generate novel conjectures about learning
that are then incorporated into the theoretical framework
driving the design. In turn, this framework drives the next
iteration of design, and so on. This type of reflective
practice (Scho¨n 1983), while vital in all aspects of scien-
tific inquiry, is foregrounded in DBR. In our experience,
the high frequency of observations emerging from DBR,
many of which are unexpected, make it ideal when dealing
with a novel research space, such as issues of embodiment,
because it stimulates the generation of conjectures neces-
sary for further experimental evaluation and theory
building.
3.2 Embodied design and the case of the Mathematical
Imagery Trainer
Our design project began with the following assertion: To
the extent that mathematical knowledge is grounded in
motor action schemes, constructivist instruction should
attend to motor action knowledge—its nature, construction,
and interaction with enactive, semiotic, and epistemic
means in the learning environment. One model for such
instruction, embodied design (Abrahamson 2009, 2012,
2013; Abrahamson and Lindgren 2014), is to design tech-
nologically enabled fields of promoted action that elicit
existing motor schemes yet challenge the learner to adapt
and articulate new schemes and ultimately signify them
within the discipline’s semiotic system. Embodied design
is thus a framework that seeks to promote grounded
learning by creating situations in which learners can be
guided to negotiate tacit and disciplinary ways of per-
ceiving and acting. In turn, the hands-on nature of
embodied design learning activities typically renders users’
implicit mental actions physically explicit and thus acces-
sible for non-invasive investigation. The Mathematical
Imagery Trainer for Proportion (MIT-P, see below) is an
example of the action-based design genre for fostering
embodied mathematical learning.
Our experimental design was driven by a general con-
jecture that some mathematical concepts are difficult to
learn due to a resource constraint of mundane life. Namely,
everyday being does not occasion opportunities to embody
and rehearse the particular dynamical schemes that would
form requisite cognitive substrate for meaningfully appro-
priating the target concepts’ disciplinary analysis of situ-
ated phenomena. Specifically, we conjectured that
students’ canonically incorrect solutions for rational-num-
ber problems—‘‘additive’’ solutions (e.g., ‘‘2/3 = (2 ? 2)/
(3 ? 2) = 4/5’’)—may indicate a lack of multimodal kin-
esthetic–visual action images with which to model and
solve situations bearing proportional relations (e.g., Pirie
and Kieren 1994).
In response to the design problem articulated above, we
engineered an embodied-interaction computer-supported
inquiry activity for learners to discover, rehearse, and thus
embody presymbolic dynamics pertaining to the mathe-
matics of proportional transformation. At the center of our
instructional design is the Mathematical Imagery Trainer
for Proportion device (MIT-P; see Fig. 1).
The MIT-P measures the heights of the users’ hands
above the desk. When these heights (e.g., 10 and 20 cm)
relate in accord with the unknown ratio set on the inter-
viewer’s console (e.g., 1:2), the screen is green. If the user
then raises her hands in front of the display at an appro-
priate rate, the screen will remain green; otherwise, such as
if she maintains a fixed distance between her hands while
moving them up, the screen will turn red. Study partici-
pants were tasked first to make the screen green and then,
once they had done so, to maintain a green screen even as
they moved their hands. For more technical details, see
Howison et al. (2011).3
3 For a brief video demonstration of the MIT-P, see https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=n9xVC76PlWc.
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At first, the condition for green was set as a 1:2 ratio,
and no feedback other than the background color was given
(see Fig. 2a). Then, cursors were introduced that ‘‘mir-
rored’’ the location of participants’ hands (see Fig. 2b).
Next, a grid was overlaid on the display monitor to help
learners plan, execute, and interpret their manipulations
and, so doing, begin to articulate quantitative verbal
assertions (see Fig. 2c). In time, the numerical labels ‘‘1, 2,
3,…’’ were overlaid on the grid’s vertical axis on the left of
the screen to help learners construct further meanings by
more readily recruiting arithmetic knowledge and skills
and more efficiently distributing the problem-solving task
(see Fig. 2d).
In the interest of clearly laying out our investigate
approach, it is worth noting that the structured task
described above evolved through iterations of MIT-P
implementations. We spread the implementation of the
interviews thinly (no more than two per day), such that
from day to day we would be able to introduce changes to
the materials, activities, and protocol in light of the
emergence and refinement of theoretical constructs. These
rapid-prototyping changes were based on fieldnotes, pre-
liminary analyses of multimodal utterance, minutes from
our team’s daily debriefings, and collaborative, editable
online postings. Thus, both the interview protocol and the
interactive affordances of the instructional materials
evolved as we progressed through the pool of participants.
We gradually incorporated into the protocol any activities
and prompts that arose during interviews and that, during
our debriefing, we evaluated as eliciting ‘‘researchable
moments’’ from the participants. These were moments in
which unexpected behavior from a participant suggested
new theoretical constructs that we wished to test in sub-
sequent interviews.
In addition to preliminary analysis undertaken during
the project’s implementation phase, we engaged in more
intensive retrospective analysis, using a technique we now
explain.
3.3 Microgenetic analysis
Our primary approach to making sense of the video data
collected during the implementation of the MIT-P is mi-
crogenetic analysis. Generally speaking, microgenetic
analysis is an intensive investigation of a relatively brief
period (often much less than a minute) of rapidly changing
competence, with the aim of making sense of processes
underlying this change. Why undertake this type of inten-
sive investigation, rather than, say, pre- and post-test ana-
lysis? Before we share our own reasons, we wish to share
Siegler’s (2006, p. 468):
If learning followed a straight line, [microgenetic
analysis] would be unnecessary. Yet, cognitive
change involves regression as well as progression,
odd transitional states that are present only briefly but
that are crucial for the changes to occur… and many
other surprising features. Simply put, the only way to
Fig. 1 The Mathematical Imagery Trainer for Proportion (MIT-P) set
at a 1:2 ratio, so that the target sensory stimulus (green background) is
activated only when the right hand is twice as high along the monitor
as the left. This figure encapsulates participants’ paradigmatic
interaction sequence: a the student first positions the hands incorrectly
(red feedback); b stumbles on a correct position (green); c raises
hands maintaining a fixed interval between them (red); and d ‘‘cor-
rects’’ position (green). Note the difference between b and d
Fig. 2 MIT-P display configuration schematics, beginning with a a
blank screen, and then featuring a set of symbolical objects
incrementally overlaid by the facilitator onto the display: b cursors;
c a grid; and d numerals along the y-axis of the grid. These schematics
are not drawn to scale, and the actual device enables flexible
calibrations of the grid, numerals, and target ratio
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find out how children learn is to study them closely
while they are learning.
Our own reasons for this time-intensive analysis involve
not only our commitment to investigating the embodied
aspects of learning, but also our vigilance against forming
plausible-sounding yet faulty rational narratives of the
learning process. This statement bears some explaining.
First, in our experience, intensive interrogation of video
data is necessary to detect embodied nuance that may go
otherwise unnoticed. What may have been ignored as a
series of ‘‘inconsequential’’ gestures is instead evaluated as
potentially a vital aspect, and thus indication, of the ges-
turer’s understanding. Transcriptions, even highly detailed
ones that include bodily movement, cannot capture in vivo
activity with sufficient fidelity for explorative analysis.
Instead, we value an investigative approach where a human
observes another’s activity, typically over and over again.
Second, there is a constant lure to interpret learning
process as teleological, as though the child necessarily
reasons rationally toward a logical conclusion. This is a
form of historical revisionism, that is, reading onto the
beginning of a micro-process something that emerged only
at its end; ascribing to a child an understanding that was not
present at a particular moment. This type of revisionism is
liable to ignore aspects of activity that do not fit the
researcher’s ‘‘tidy’’ narrative, such as bodily movement at
odds with verbal utterances. To echo Maturana (1987),
‘‘Everything is said by an observer’’ (p. 65). We find mi-
crogenetic analysis a strong guard against historical revi-
sionism and confounding our expert observations with
those of the students we study (see also Maheux and Pro-
ulx, 2015 [this issue], on the methodological challenges of
analyzing data within an Enactivist framework).
We conclude this section with a few practical comments
about the application, reliability, and validity of microge-
netic analysis. Making inferences on the basis of video-
taped performance data is a ‘‘highly subjective and
interpretive enterprise’’ (Schoenfeld et al. 1991, p. 70). To
this end, analysis is collaborative, a form of competitive
argumentation where each member of the research team
puts forth an interpretation of recorded events. An inter-
pretation is considered viable if all members of the research
team are convinced by it. This includes members wit-
nessing it for the first time as a video recording. Interpre-
tations that fail to gather sufficient support are not
discarded but instead recorded as such. In fact, we
encourage and welcome challenging interpretations,
because they force us to embody the observed learner’s
actions. We mean this literally: occasionally we may
physically act out what we observe, thus acquiring unex-
pected perspectives. Through personal mimetic
reconstruction of recorded multimodal activity we may
arrive at completely unexpected insight, for example, that
perhaps our subject lowered her arms not as an exploration
action but simply because she was physically fatigued from
holding them up in the air for too long! While intensive in
time and effort, we find microgenetic analysis invaluable in
our investigations of embodiment. The high frequency of
observations and emergent conjectures make it an excellent
companion to design-based research.
4 Findings: from motor problem solving to conceptual
learning
In accord with our thesis, our discussion of empirical
findings will focus on the processes by which our study
participants changed their motor action patterns through
engaging in problem-solving activities within our instru-
mented fields of promoted action. We will be looking at
both smooth and abrupt transitions.4 With respect to
smooth transitions, we will consider the case of learning to
control new phenomena that demand variations on existing
schemes (Case 4.1). With respect to abrupt transitions, we
will consider the role of artifacts—auxiliary stimuli—as
dramatically perturbing schemes previously established as
effective for controlling phenomena, thus prompting indi-
viduals to establish new schemes still broadly within the
task demands (Case 4.2).5
4.1 Smooth transition: solving a motor action problem
by adjusting a scheme
Our first case analysis, Siena, is a 6th-grade student iden-
tified by her teachers as low achieving. This case followed
the standard protocol: with the interaction condition set at a
1:2 ratio, Siena was tasked to ‘‘make the screen green’’ and
encouraged to explore the interactive space. Quickly, she
generated a green screen and affixed her hands at that
posture. DA (first author) encouraged her to look for green
elsewhere, and she continued exploring. As with all
learners in our study, Siena initially kept the distance
between her hands fixed as she attempted to find another
green, resulting in a red screen. Two minutes later, DT
(second author) asked Siena to explain her discoveries to
another (hypothetical) learner. She noted three green
‘‘places’’ on the screen, corresponding to high, middle, and
low bimanual postures. Siena added, ‘‘You’d have to have
4 Interestingly, dynamical-systems research into coordination of
bimanual action (Kelso and Engstrøm 2006, p. 208) has demonstrated
a dichotomy between ‘‘smooth’’ and ‘‘abrupt’’ transitions in the
development of motor skill, analogous to our findings.
5 For further empirical results from this line of work, see Abraham-
son et al. (2014).
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the right hand higher up slightly… You’d have to be slow
and careful’’.
Next, DT asked Siena to reproduce the ‘‘high’’ green.
Once she had done so, DA attempted to steer Siena toward
discovering the effective interaction rule by asking her to
reproduce the low green, then the high, then the low again.
She did so with relative precision. For an observer it is
evident that the distance between her hands was changing
correlative to their elevation over the desk, and yet Siena
did not account for this change. DA then asked Siena
whether she could move from low green to high green
keeping the screen ‘‘green all the time’’. Siena tried to
accomplish this by moving very fast, resulting in a red
screen. She continued, now moving slower, until a minute
later she was able to keep the screen green continuously
while raising and lowering her hands, making corrections
as needed. At this point, the interviewers agreed (com-
municated via glances) that Siena had apparently deter-
mined a working theorem for ‘‘making green’’. And yet,
the following exchange ensued.
DT: You seem to have figured something out. Can you
share with us what it is?
Siena: [shrugs, smiling] Not really
DA: So what have you learned so far?
Siena: [pauses, searching for words] It’s really hard to
keep steady, to go high up [mimes smooth
bimanual motion upward] but it’s possible
DA: Is there any rule? How would you explain this to
someone else?
Siena: Um, just try to keep focused on the screen… keep
steady and try to keep like that at equal, and got to
be sort of equal and like move your hands at the
same time. Like, if it’s like this [demonstrates by
holding hands apart at a fixed distance], then you
have to move them both up at the same amount
apart [moves hands up at a fixed distance]
Recall that just prior we had observed Siena skillfully
‘‘keeping the screen green’’ and so assumed that she had
formulated a new action theorem. Yet it may be that Siena
became proficient at the motor action in the absence of a
conscious action theorem: she articulated the fixed-interval
strategy despite manually demonstrating the appropriate
changing-interval action. It appears that Siena performed a
rapid succession of minute local corrections to green even
through the consistent pattern of these automatisms had not
yet emerged as a global awareness.
DA then guided Siena to evaluate her fixed-interval rule
empirically. Complying, Siena found a low green and then
raised both hands, keeping a fixed interval, which resulted
in a red screen. DT then took over the right-hand device,
and they worked together, moving up slowly.
Siena: Always the right hand should move up a little
higher… this one [right] should move slightly
faster than the other one. The right hand should be
slightly faster than the left, but they should still
keep at sort of the same pace
DA: What do you mean by pace?
Siena: Like, if this one’s [right] going like this [moves
upward quickly] then this one [left] should be
going slightly slower than the other one
Several minutes later, DA asked Siena to explain fur-
ther what she meant by ‘‘pace’’. She offered that ‘‘[pace
is] sort of a continuous speed. They should be at a dif-
ferent speed, but they’re both at their own continuous
speed’’. During this utterance, she gestured forward, in a
series of away-from-body saccades. When asked, again, to
summarize for the sake of the hypothetical fellow student
what she had learned, she offered: ‘‘Make the right hand
go a little bit faster, but let them both be at their own
continuous pace’’. We consider this a smooth transition
from the fixed-interval theorem to a different-pace theo-
rem. We labeled such transitions ‘‘smooth’’ because the
change from one motor pattern to the other was gradual, a
series of micro-adjustments. Some of these micro-adjust-
ments were so subtle that Siena herself seemed unaware
of them!
Thus we see Siena’s progress from: (a) performing
fixed-interval action; to (b) performing changing-interval
action yet articulating a fixed-interval theorem;
(c) reverting to fixed-interval performance; and (d) both
physically and verbally expressing a right-is-faster-than-
left strategy. It is worth noticing that Siena had solved the
motor action problem before she could describe it. This
may be an indication that, at the time, she was not yet
consciously aware of the ‘difference’ (see Sect. 2.3).
Moreover, by mis-describing her effective motor action
skill and then operating on this mis-description, Siena
temporarily regressed to ineffective motor action. By
asking Siena to articulate verbally her effective motor
action, the interviewers imposed on Siena what Bamber-
ger and diSessa (2003) have termed ‘‘ontological impe-
rialism’’, conventional semiotic systems that warp the
perceptions of the uninitiated by parsing phenomena into
static formal units that jar with action-oriented percep-
tuomotor interaction schemes. It is as though, asked to
explain where his arms are as he walks, a person asserted
that the right arm swings forward when the right leg does
and then actually walked that way! When Siena finally
achieved a global description of her effective physical
enactment, this articulated theorem enabled her to re-
visualize and enhance her tacit local coupling with the
technological device.
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4.2 Abrupt transition: mathematical artifacts
reconfigure motor solutions
When the grid is overlaid on the screen (see Fig. 2c),
learners tend to respond in a behavior pattern we have
termed ‘‘snap-to-grid’’—their hitherto continuous motions
along the screen become parsed into discrete moves from
one grid line to the next. Their utterances, too, transition
from qualitative to quantitative language.
Our second case analysis is Amalia, a 5th-grade stu-
dent identified by her teacher as average achieving.
Amalia was quick to locate her first green and even
quicker at solving the motor problem of moving the hands
upward while keeping the screen green. Interestingly,
introducing the grid artifact onto the screen actually
impeded her green-making performance, even as it gran-
ted predictive and communicative power. Unlike Siena,
who occasionally struggled with the requisite manual
dexterity, Amalia had no such issues. And this, we
believe, makes Amalia’s case particularly interesting, for
she demonstrated a high degree of adroitness in effecting
green yet forsook this adroitness in favor of a grid-based
alternating right-hand–left-hand ratcheting-up strategy,
which we call a-per-b: or, in the case of the 1:2 ratio,
‘‘For every 1 that I go up on the left, I go up 2 on the
right’’.
Amalia, similar to all other participants, began by
finding green and then attempting a fixed-interval action,
resulting in a red screen. Immediately, Amalia tuned into
the interactive phenomenon—she developed the skill of
performing rapid local adjustments so as to maintain a
green screen while moving both hands. The following
conversation then ensued.
DT: You’re doing really well here. Do you have
some sort of rule you’re following?
Amalia: [continuing to move her hands up and down,
creating a more-or-less continuously green
screen with occasional flashes of red] Um, I’m
trying to keep them at a different distance
DT: How so?
Amalia: Well, I’m keeping this one [right] higher
Shortly, DT asked Amalia to say more on this ‘‘different
distance’’ strategy.
Amalia: Well, I’m keeping [left-hand held level at a
fixed height, she moves right-hand up and
down]… I’m seeing if… which one… [moves
both left and right up and down] how high I
should keep them apart.…
Amalia: You have to keep this one [right] higher, and
then you just have to try to see where it wants to
be
Clearly, Amalia was operating on the basis of local
adjustments. Next, we introduced the grid.
DT: So, what does this look like?
Amalia: A grid
Unprompted, Amalia lifts the controllers from the desk,
raises the left-hand cursor to the first gridline and the right-
hand cursor to the second gridline, resulting in a green
screen. After a brief pause, she moves both objects upward,
retaining only some of the smoothness that had character-
ized her earlier performance.
DT: Can the grid help us in some way?
Amalia: Yeah, because you can measure how high…
how much farther one of them should be
Immediately, Amalia snapped to grid. She utilized the
measuring affordance of the grid, yet in so doing became
grid-bound: her hitherto continuous and simultaneous
actions became saccadic and sequential.
Ten minutes later, we removed the grid and asked
Amalia if she could ‘‘keep it green now’’. To our surprise,
she did not revert to the pre-grid continuous actions but
instead perseverated with the gridded, ratcheting motor
actions even though the grid lines themselves were no
longer visible. Afterwards, she explained her strategy as
follows.
Amalia: I’m remembering where the… things were. I’m
trying to do it in my head, remembering where
they were
This we found interesting because Amalia had previ-
ously done remarkably well by ‘‘trying to see where it
wants to be’’ in a sequence of micro-adjustments. Yet the
abrupt and radical shift in her behavior instigated by the
grid artifact was so substantial as to effectively replace her
earlier scheme. In terms of instrumental genesis theory of
activity situations (Ve´rillon and Rabardel 1995), by in-
strumentalizing the grid as a means of accomplishing the
task objective, Amalia instrumented herself with a new
utilization schema. Effecting green with the grid bore
residual effect on her effecting green without it (Salomon
et al. 1991).
In summary of findings here presented, our first case
study learner, Siena, smoothly adjusted her motor action to
accommodate the embedded interaction rules of a new
phenomenon long before she was able to explain her
scheme as a global action plan, so much so that attempting
this explicit articulation boomeranged by supplanting her
implicit action procedure. Our second case study learner,
Amalia, abruptly changed her action scheme once she had
recognized the potential enactive utility of an artifact
(grid). As it turned out, the resulting motor action was so
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robust that Amalia sustained and applied it even in the
absence of the external resources that had initially
prompted the new action pattern.
We are struck by the situatedness of our young partici-
pants’ proto-mathematical utterances, as they express reg-
ularities they discern in the interactive phenomena they
learn to control. These are not conceptual metaphors pro-
jected from the concrete source domain to the abstract
target domain. To the learners’ phenomenology, the would-
be abstract domain does not pre-exist but is brought forth
via dialogic reflection on the perceptual guidance of action.
5 Conclusions
If we are to take seriously the thesis that mathematical
reasoning is embodied and emerging from goal-oriented
situated interactions within a particular ecology, then
research on motor-skill development may offer useful
perspectives for research on mathematics learning. In
particular, when instructors foster new schemas by creating
structured interaction opportunities centered on manipu-
lating pedagogical artifacts, motor-learning research can
help us understand the relation between task, context, and
action as well as the effect of semiotic systems on bringing
forth mathematical concepts by perturbing and signifying
learners’ budding operatory schemes.
The embodiment approach to mathematics pedagogy
bears implications for the future of Enactivist scholarship.
When scholars of Enactivism approach the problem of
conceptual learning through the lens of perception–action
irreducibility, they acknowledge that individuals’ cognitive
development is circumscribed by opportunities to engage
in, and reflect on, motor problem solving. As educational
designers, we take the Enactivist thesis as a cue to foster
structured opportunities for students to engage in the
solution of motor problem solving oriented toward con-
ceptual development. Yet as educational researchers we
consistently critique existing theoretical models, including
our own, that allegedly explain how motor problem solving
begets conceptual understanding. In this paper, we have
sought outside mainstream learning sciences literature for
accounts of ontogenetic development alternative to the
ever-popular theory of conceptual metaphor.
That said, we agree that the ontological status of static
material displays such as mathematical diagrams should be
interpreted in light of the spatial–temporal dynamics of the
cognizer’s sensorimotor phenomenology (Sinclair et al.
2013). And yet one need not warrant these ontological
observations with psycholinguistic-developmental models
of cognition, especially given cognitive developmental
findings of innate cerebral inclination to coordinate spatial,
temporal, and quantitative perceptions (de Hevia et al.
2014). There is much methodological appeal in models of
conceptual metaphors and blends (Fauconnier and Turner
2002; Hutchins 2014), however, these models of cognition
maintain vestiges of representationalist epistemology.
Meanwhile, alternative accounts of human behavior are
being put forth that do away entirely with the assumption
of mental content, including philosophers of cognitive
science offering radical theory of embodiment (Chemero
2009; Hutto 2013) and cognitive developmental empiricists
offering an action-oriented emergent constructivism (Allen
and Bickhard 2013). In fact, we view our research program
as contextualizing and examining the implications of this
paradigm shift for the theory and practice of mathematics
education. In turn, the unique empirical contexts of our
design-based research may offer the field more nuanced
and more comprehensive accounts that draw on the wide
spectrum of the learning sciences.
In particular, this paper draws attention to the changes
learners incorporate into their perceptuomotor schemes
when they engage in problem-solving tasks that demand
manual coordination. Inspired by the theoretical construct
of a ‘‘field of promoted action’’ (Reed and Bril 1996), we
interpreted these adjustments as resulting from a culture’s
intervention in individuals’ development. These coordina-
tive adjustment automatisms may lead to conceptual
development, and we have demonstrated the implementa-
tion of a pedagogical ideology and design framework for
nurturing new schemes into disciplinary knowledge. As
designers of mathematics learning environments, our
practice has been to create instrumented fields of promoted
action that elicit, challenge, and destabilize learners’
habitual coordination, stabilize these into new coordinated
action structures, and steer learners to signify these struc-
tures in mathematics register.
Our case studies, we believe, support a view that the
analysis of motor problem solving can shed light on
learners’ emergent conceptual understandings. Akin to
scholars of motor learning, we view learners’ idiosyncratic
actions as more than background noise that may at best
provide a helping hand in learning—‘‘the uniqueness of
knowledge, its historicity and context, is not a ‘noise’
concealing an abstract configuration in its true essence’’
(Varela 1999, p. 7). Indeed, our research program supports
a view of learning as emerging in the complex, dynamical
synergy of, on the one hand, individual goal-oriented
actions and, on the other hand, acculturating agents who
construct and administer fields of promoted action.
We find of particular value the role of conscious inter-
pretation of transitions to novel motor solutions, both
smooth and abrupt. That is, for the learners in our study,
discovery came literally as that—an emergent discovery—
as they discovered in their own actions something they
could not have predicted beforehand. These eureka
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moments resulted from bringing conscious awareness to
the felt difference of their action or potential for action. As
such, our findings on the emergence of mathematical rea-
soning through embodied interaction seem to support pre-
vious findings in therapeutic and academic studies of motor
learning (Ginsburg 2010).
Within education, motor learning and conceptual
learning have long been seen as separate research pro-
grams, complete with their own theories and methodolo-
gies. Yet recent advances suggest that these disciplines
share some—perhaps much—common ground. One need
only consider that motor learning is conceived of and
studied as solutions to motor problems. After all, actions
are not mere movement but involve goals and meaningful
coping with circumstances. Motor learning, in our view,
involves a degree of sense-making in the world, which is
close to the heart of conceptual learning.
It might appear to some readers that we have ventured
toward relatively esoteric intellectual fields in this article
on mathematics teaching and learning. We therefore wish
to conclude with von Glasersfeld (1983), who writes on the
dynamical foundations of mathematical ontogenesis and
emphasizes the pedagogical importance of consciousness.
[T]he primary goal of mathematics instruction has to
be the students’ conscious understanding of what he
or she is doing and why it is being done. This
understanding is not unlike the self-awareness the
athlete must acquire in order consciously to make an
improvement in his physical routine. …[W]hat the
mathematics teacher is striving to instill into the
student is ultimately the awareness of a dynamic
program and its execution—and that awareness is in
principle similar to what the athlete is able to glean…
from his or her performance. (pp. 51–52)
In the same paper, Glasersfeld offers that, while research
in mathematics education has under-delivered,
this disappointment—I want to emphasize this—is
not restricted to mathematics education but has come
to involve teaching and the didactic methods in vir-
tually all disciplines. To my knowledge, there is only
one exception that forms a remarkable contrast: the
teaching of physical and, especially, athletic skills.
There is no cause for disappointment in that area. (p.
42)
von Glasersfeld is implying that we ought to look to
those domains that have been the exception. We agree. In
our view, the disciplines of motor and conceptual learning
stand to draw increasingly closer. For all involved, learning
is moving in new ways.
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